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Note 
THE REVERSE-COMMANDEERING SYSTEM: A 




ABSTRACT—Current regimes for distributing state and local authority have 
two primary flaws: (1) they unnecessarily restrict local authority by 
preventing local governments from passing private laws, and (2) they often 
require local ordinances to be enforced in state courts, thereby depriving 
local governments of the ability to interpret their own laws and requiring 
states to pay the judicial costs of local policy preferences. This Note 
suggests a new means of distributing state and local authority designed to 
address these two deficiencies: the reverse-commandeering system. The 
reverse-commandeering system would not distinguish between local 
authority to pass public and private laws. Instead, the reverse-
commandeering system would (1) give local governments the option to 
create, staff, and fund their own municipal courts and (2) prevent local 
governments from passing ordinances that could not be enforced in their 
municipal courts. By doing so, the reverse-commandeering system would 
allow local governments to realize the benefits of private law and relieve 
states of the financial burden of the judicial enforcement of local 
ordinances. 
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Nowhere has democracy ever worked well without a great measure of local 
self-government . . . . 
—Friedrich A. Hayek† 
INTRODUCTION 
Fayetteville, Arkansas, wants to make it illegal for businesses to 
discriminate against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
individuals.1 Arkansas does not.2 Should Fayetteville be allowed to do so? 
 
 † 2 F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 234 (Bruce Caldwell ed., definitive ed. 2007). 
 1 Max Brantley, Fayetteville Adopts Civil Rights Ordinance 53-47, ARK. TIMES: ARK. BLOG (Sept. 
8, 2015, 8:00 PM), http://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2015/09/08/early-vote-favors-
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Should it be allowed to give LGBT individuals a right to bring lawsuits 
against those who discriminate against them? Should Fayetteville be able to 
transfer the costs of trying these lawsuits onto the state of Arkansas? This 
Note presents the current answers to these questions, finds them lacking, 
and suggests a new system for state and local relations based on the 
practical and theoretical benefits of robust local democracy as well as basic 
principles concerning the relationship between the political and judicial 
branches of a government. 
Since its independence, the United States of America has served as an 
example of the possible benefits of strong local democracies.3 Yet 
American local governments have always been hindered by unnecessary 
and illogical constraints on their authority.4 Over the last century, however, 
Americans have increasingly embraced local law and its unique 
capabilities, and significant impediments on local authority have been 
removed as local governments have been empowered in important new 
ways.5 But this process of local empowerment has resulted in a lopsided 
system for distributing state and local authority with two primary problems: 
(1) in many states, local governments still have too little lawmaking 
authority, and (2) because local laws are often enforced in state courts, 
local governments are able to force states to shoulder the judicial costs of 
their local policy preferences. This Note proposes a new system for 
organizing state and local authority that addresses both problems: the 
reverse-commandeering system. 
The first problem with current systems for distributing local and state 
authority—too little local authority—stems from the “private law 
exception” to local home rule authority. Today, almost all states give local 
governments “home rule authority”—the power to enact municipal law on 
local issues subject to preemption by state legislation.6 However, many 
home rule states impose a private law exception which prevents local 
governments from using their home rule power to create “private law.”7 
 
fayetteville-civil-rights-ordinance-68-32 [https://perma.cc/PC8Y-HYUP] (discussing the civil rights 
ordinance passed by Fayetteville in September 2015). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 3 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba 
Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000) (1835). 
 4 See infra Part I. 
 5 See id. 
 6 See infra Section I.B. 
 7 See infra Section I.C. 
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Generally, private law is defined as law that establishes legal rights and 
duties between private entities.8 
The private law exception is problematic for at least four reasons. 
First, the private law exception makes it more difficult for local 
governments to accomplish their practical objectives. Private laws can be 
effective tools for local governments seeking to address local problems or 
capitalize on local strengths. For example, for local governments like 
Fayetteville, Arkansas, that want to minimize private discrimination against 
LGBT individuals, local laws that make it illegal for private employers to 
discriminate against LGBT individuals would presumably be an effective 
means of doing so. Second, preventing local governments from passing 
private laws shuts the door on a potentially vibrant area of local policy 
experimentation.9 Third, the private law exception deprives local 
governments of a means by which they can differentiate themselves from 
one another, thereby contracting the array of local political systems that 
people can choose to join. 
The fourth flaw with the private law exception is that it is poorly 
tailored to addressing two of its supposed goals. Professor Terrance 
Sandalow and other supporters of the private law exception argue that it is 
necessary to prevent the disruption to commerce that would result from 
multiple jurisdictions within a state with their own unique rules.10 However, 
states are already able to address the specific situations where they find the 
existence of different local laws to be problematic by preempting varying 
local rules through state legislation or by simply passing a statute 
preventing local governments from legislating on certain topics.11 Unlike 
the private law exception, this solution gives states the freedom to address 
the private local laws that they find to be problematic while allowing 
variation and experimentation where a state considers it to be appropriate. 
These supporters of the private law exception also argue that it avoids the 
unfairness that would result from imposing large penalties for violating 
 
 8 Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Four Senses of the Public Law–Private Law Distinction, 9 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 270 (1986). 
 9 See infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
 10 E.g., Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the 
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 678–79 (1964); W. P. Davidson & J. F. Shumaker, Comment, The 
Power of Ohio Municipalities to Enact Municipal Law, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 152, 153 (1948) [hereinafter, 
Davidson & Shumaker, Power of Ohio Municipalities]; Comment, Municipal Home Rule Power: 
Impact on Private Legal Relationships, 56 IOWA L. REV. 631, 632 (1971) [hereinafter, Comment, 
Municipal Home Rule].  
 11 See infra Section IV.B.1. 
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hard-to-find local rules.12 However, states can address any concerns about 
the accessibility of local ordinances by passing state statutes requiring local 
governments to make their ordinances more accessible. 
Professor Paul Diller does make one legitimate point in favor of the 
private law exception: because local ordinances are often enforced in state-
funded state courts, allowing local governments to pass private laws 
enables local governments to force the state to pay the judicial costs of 
advancing a local government’s policy preferences.13 However, this 
criticism applies equally to public local laws that are enforced in state 
courts and, therefore, justifies a “local law exception” (i.e., a rule that 
prevents local governments from passing any laws) as much as it justifies a 
private law exception. 
Recognizing the validity of this criticism, as well as its application to 
public local laws, the reverse-commandeering system14 proposes replacing 
the private law exception with the “reverse-commandeering exception”: a 
state rule that (1) gives local governments the option to create, staff, and 
fund their own municipal courts and (2) prevents local governments from 
passing any laws that could not be enforced in their own municipal courts. 
The result would be that local governments that want to use their legislative 
authority to further their own policy preferences are required to pay the 
judicial costs associated with their laws and policies. State courts would 
remain available to hear cases alleging that municipal ordinances and 
judicial processes violate state law. 
The reverse-commandeering exception would have several important 
benefits. It would require states to give local governments the option to 
create municipal courts, which would lead to a stronger relationship 
between the court and the local community and increased local control of 
the interpretation of local ordinances.15 It would also reduce state budgets, 
an important issue considering the financial concerns of many states, by 
logically distributing the costs of state and municipal court systems based 
on the roles of courts of original and appellate jurisdiction.16 Additionally, 
 
 12 See Gary T. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 20 UCLA L. 
REV. 671, 720–28 (1973). 
 13 Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1153–54 
(2012). 
 14 The reverse-commandeering system gets its name from Professor Diller’s label for the argument 
that the private law exception is justified because it prevents local governments from "commandeering" 
states by forcing the state to pay the judicial costs associated with local private laws. See id. 
 15 See infra Section IV.C. 
 16 See infra Section IV.D. 
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the reverse-commandeering exception would minimize any confusion over 
the source of a particular law.17 
Part I introduces the flawed current systems for distributing state and 
local authority, paying particular attention to Dillon’s Rule, home rule 
authority, and the private law exception. Part II transitions to a discussion 
of the judicial enforcement of local ordinances, focusing on the role 
municipal courts play in different state legal systems. Part III introduces the 
reverse-commandeering system of state and local relations, and Part IV 
lays out its advantages over current systems for distributing state and local 
political and judicial authority. 
I. CURRENT SYSTEMS FOR DISTRIBUTING STATE AND LOCAL 
AUTHORITY 
The foundational principle of local–state relations is that, legally 
speaking, local governments are and always have been merely “creature[s] 
of the State.”18 The United States Constitution does not explicitly assign 
local governments any rights, functions, or responsibilities; states are free 
to create, destroy, and empower local governments as they see fit.19 A 
corollary of this principle is that states can determine the scope of local 
governments’ authority—a local government is not only a creature of the 
state, it is also “a delegate of the state, possessing only those powers the 
state has chosen to confer upon it.”20 This Part discusses the scope of 
authority that states currently choose to bestow upon local governments. 
Section I.A begins with a discussion of Dillon’s Rule, the primary 
means for determining local authority for most of American history, and its 
modern-day relevance. Then, Section I.B discusses home rule authority. 
Lastly, Section I.C considers the private law exception, its justifications, 
and the various means through which states have imposed it. 
A. Dillon’s Rule 
The story of the evolution of local government authority begins with 
Dillon’s Rule, a rule of judicial construction derived from the 
aforementioned principle that local governments only possess the authority 
delegated to them by the state.21 Under Dillon’s Rule, local governments 
only possess (1) the powers expressly granted them by the states, (2) the 
 
 17 See infra Section IV.E. 
 18 City of Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539, 548–49 (1905). 
 19 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Leslie Bender, Note, Home Rule, Revisited, 10 J. LEGIS. 231, 234 (1983). 
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powers implied in or incident to those expressly granted, and (3) the 
powers “essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and 
purposes of the corporation.”22 Dillon’s Rule further provides that, when 
there is any doubt as to whether a local government possesses a certain 
power, courts should hold that the local government does not possess that 
power.23 Thus, Dillon’s Rule functions as “a standard of delegation, a 
canon of construction and a rule of limited power” designed to ensure that 
local governments only exercise those powers that states have actually 
granted them.24 
Dillon’s Rule was originally enunciated by Chief Justice John Dillon 
of the Iowa Supreme Court in an 1868 case.25 It quickly became the 
prevailing rule in most states and sustained its popularity through the 
middle of the twentieth century.26 While legally based on the absence of 
any explicit constitutional delegation of authority to local governments,27 
Dillon’s Rule was also based on a pessimistic conception of the capabilities 
and importance of local governments.28 Today, most states have abandoned 
Dillon’s Rule largely because “it failed to recognize local government’s 
sophistication, its importance in the political process, and the variety and 
complexity of issues it faces.”29 Only eight states still use Dillon’s Rule as 
their primary means of determining state and local authority.30 Most states 
have replaced Dillon’s Rule with some version of home rule. 
B. Home Rule 
In the late nineteenth century, states began to supplant Dillon’s Rule 
with home rule in an effort to empower local governments.31 The first home 
rule provisions basically made local governments “state[s] within . . . 
state[s]”: they delegated local governments the entirety of the police power 
with respect to local affairs and granted local governments immunity from 
 
 22 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 
1911). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Briffault, supra note 19, at 8. 
 25 Bender, supra note 21, at 234 n.21. 
 26 Briffault, supra note 19, at 9. 
 27 Bender, supra note 21, at 234 (discussing the “creature theory” of local government). 
 28 See Frona M. Powell, Challenging Authority for Municipal Subdivision Exactions: The Ultra 
Vires Attack, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 651 (1990). 
 29 Id. 
 30 These eight states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Nevada, New Hampshire, Vermont, Virginia, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming. Diller, supra note 13, at 1129 n.99. 
 31 Bender, supra note 21, at 235–37. 
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state legislative interference.32 Today, however, very few home rule 
provisions provide local governments with immunity from legislative 
interference in local affairs33—generally, ordinances passed under a local 
government’s home rule authority can be preempted by state legislation.34 
Thus, for purposes of this Note, the term “home rule authority” will be used 
to refer to a local government’s authority to pass local ordinances that can 
be preempted by state legislation. However, the exact scope of local 
governments’ home rule authority varies from state to state.35 
Home rule was designed to enhance the authority of local 
governments.36 It was motivated by a belief in local government, a desire 
“to allow the governmental unit closest to the people to minister to their 
needs.”37 The transition from Dillon’s Rule to home rule is a positive 
development when viewed through the lens of the major theoretical 
justifications for local government. For instance, Charles Tiebout argues 
that local government autonomy is a positive because it enhances the 
variety of public-good models available for prospective residents to choose 
among.38 Robert Nozick makes a similar argument that more local 
autonomy allows local governments to provide competing “utopias” 
citizens can choose to join.39 The wisdom that can be taken from Tiebout 
and Nozick is that robust local authority is beneficial because it provides 
local governments a means of differentiating themselves from one another, 
and local differentiation benefits individuals by expanding the array of 
local political systems that they can choose to join. 
Home rule can also be justified on practical grounds. Different 
localities face different problems that require different solutions, and local 
governments should be empowered to craft the solutions that best fit their 
particular problems. As the Supreme Court of Ohio put it, “the problems of 
the village are essentially different from the problems of the metropolitan 
center. It was in recognition of these truths that the . . . Ohio Constitution 
 
 32 Briffault, supra note 19, at 10. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Patrick M. Steel, Obesity Regulation Under Home Rule: An Argument That Regulation by Local 
Governments Is Superior to Administrative Agencies, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1127, 1147–49 (2016). 
 35 The variation of home rule authority largely results from variation in the restrictions states 
impose on local governments’ general home rule authority. See SAMUEL B. STONE, IND. UNIV. PUB. 
POLICY INST., NO. 10-C27, HOME RULE IN THE MIDWEST 2–3 (2010). For example, Indiana state law 
prevents local governments from using their home rule authority to levy any taxes, whereas Illinois 
allows local governments to use their home rule authority to tax but forbids an income tax. Id. 
 36 Briffault, supra note 19, at 10. 
 37 Bender, supra note 21, at 237. 
 38 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956). 
 39 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 312 (1974). 
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grant[ed] to municipalities the exercise of all powers of local self-
government.”40 
Today, forty-one states employ some form of home rule.41 Most states 
have implemented home rule through a constitutional amendment.42 New 
Mexico’s is typical;43 it gives municipalities the ability to adopt a home rule 
charter and provides that “[a] municipality which adopts a [home rule] 
charter may exercise all legislative powers and perform all functions not 
expressly denied by general law or charter.”44 On the other hand, a small 
number of states have implemented home rule legislatively by passing 
legislation that grants local governments a degree of home rule authority.45 
Indiana, for example, granted its cities home rule authority through the 
Home Rule Act of 1980, a state statute.46 
C. The Private Law Exception to Local Home Rule Authority 
1. How the Private Law Exception Has Been Implemented 
It is common for states to exclude or exempt certain subject matter 
from local governments’ home rule authority.47 The most expansive such 
exception has been termed the private law exception. Generally, the private 
law exception prevents local governments from enacting private law.48 
However, there is disagreement over what exactly qualifies as private law.49 
The private law exception arose quickly after the rise of home rule.50 
By 1916, influential scholar Howard McBain was able to write that it was 
“universally accepted” that “general subjects [like] crime, domestic 
relations, wills and administration, mortgages, trusts, contracts, real and 
personal property, insurance, banking, corporations, and many others . . . 
are strictly of ‘state concern,’” and consequently are not “appropriate 
subjects of local control.”51 McBain’s view “ossified into settled doctrine 
 
 40 Dillon v. City of Cleveland, 158 N.E. 606, 611 (Ohio 1927). 
 41 Briffault, supra note 19, at 10–11; see also Diller, supra note 13, at 1129 n.99 (noting that there 
are only eight states that still follow Dillon’s Rule, plus South Dakota, which is “ambiguous”). 
 42 Bender, supra note 21, at 236. 
 43 Darin M. Dalmat, Bringing Economic Justice Closer to Home: The Legal Viability of Local 
Minimum Wage Laws Under Home Rule, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 93, 106 (2005). 
 44 N.M. CONST. art. X, § 6. 
 45 Bender, supra note 21, at 236. 
 46 STONE, supra note 35, at 2. 
 47 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 683. 
 48 Diller, supra note 13, at 1110. 
 49 See infra notes 53–62 and accompanying text. 
 50 Diller, supra note 13, at 1110. 
 51 HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 673–74 
(1916). 
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over the next few decades as courts and academic commentators generally 
accepted as undisputed the abstract proposition that home rule did not 
include the authority to regulate private law.”52 
 Although there may have been a general consensus that home rule 
did not give local governments the authority to make private law, there was 
not a consensus over exactly what amounted to private law in this context.53 
Two primary means of identifying private law developed—a subject-based 
approach and a complainant-based approach.54 The subject-based approach 
defines private law according to the subject matter of the law in question.55 
Under the subject-based approach, private laws are those that “define the 
rights and duties that private individuals and groups owe to each other.”56 
Public laws, on the other hand, regulate the conduct of government officials 
and the duties that private individuals owe the government.57 Harold 
McBain’s definition of private law, which listed the subjects that qualified 
as private law, is one example of a subject-based definition of what 
qualifies as private law.58 
The primary alternative to the subject-based approach is the 
complainant-based approach.59 The complainant-based approach 
distinguishes between private and public law based on who is entitled to 
seek judicial relief for violation of the law.60 Under this approach, private 
laws are laws that can be enforced through complaints brought by private 
individuals.61 Public laws, on the other hand, are those that are enforced by 
complaints brought by public authorities.62 This Note argues against both 
forms of the private law exception and therefore does not distinguish 
between the subject-based and complainant-based approach. 
2. How the Private Law Exception Has Been Implemented 
States have implemented the private law exception in three ways: by 
changing their constitutions, via legislation, or through judicial opinions.63 
 
 52 Diller, supra note 13, at 1114. For examples of courts and commentators explicitly endorsing 
this principle, see Wagner v. Mayor of Newark, 132 A.2d 794, 800 (N.J. 1957); Sandalow, supra note 
10, at 674; Comment, Municipal Home Rule Power, supra note 10, at 633. 
 53 Diller, supra note 13, at 1114–16. 
 54 Id. at 1116. 
 55 Barnett, supra note 8, at 270. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 59 Diller, supra note 13, at 1116. 
 60 Barnett, supra note 8, at 269. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 683. 
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First, perhaps the most common means by which states have implemented 
the private law exception is by amending their state constitutions. Many of 
these state constitutional provisions are modeled off recommended 
provisions drafted by the National League of Cities and the National 
Municipal League.64 These model provisions include the following clause 
qualifying local governments’ home rule authority: “This grant of home 
rule powers shall not include the power to enact private or civil law 
governing civil relationships except as incident to an exercise of an 
independent county or city power.”65 
Second, in some states that do not have a constitutional private law 
exception, state legislatures have passed a statute imposing one. For 
example, Delaware has not constitutionalized its private law exception, but 
its state code provides that local governments' home rule authority “does 
not include the power to enact private or civil law governing civil 
relationships except as an incident to an exercise of an independent 
municipal power.”66 
Finally, there are some states where the private law exception is 
judicially created. Missouri is a good example. Missouri’s Constitution 
gives home rule cities “all powers which the general assembly of the state 
of Missouri has authority to confer upon any city, provided such powers are 
consistent with the constitution of this state and are not limited or denied 
either by the charter so adopted or by statute.”67 This language does not 
provide any clear textual basis for a private law exception. However, 
Missouri courts have consistently and repeatedly enforced a complainant-
based private law exception under which “a city has no power, by 
municipal ordinance, to create a civil liability from one citizen to another, 
nor to relieve one citizen from that liability by imposing it on another.”68 
3. Justifications for the Private Law Exception 
Three primary justifications have been offered for the private law 
exception: preventing the disruption to commerce that would occur from 
varying local rules, avoiding unfairly punishing violators of hard-to-find 
local rules, and the structural incoherence of enforcing local laws in state 
courts. 
 
 64 Id. at 696. 
 65 NAT’L MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION art. VIII, § 8.02 (6th ed. 1963). 
 66 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 802 (West 2017). 
 67 MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a). 
 68 Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Mayor’s Comm’n on Human Rights of Springfield, 791 S.W.2d 382, 
384 (Mo. 1990) (quoting City of Joplin v. Wheeler, 158 S.W. 924, 928 (Mo. Ct. App. 1913) (citing four 
other cases applying the rule)). 
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Perhaps the primary purpose of the private law exception is preventing 
the disruption to commerce that would occur if each local government had 
its own unique rules governing private business activities.69 The general 
fear is that a proliferation of different regulatory regimes would make 
doing business in a state excessively difficult. 70 One aspect of this fear is a 
desire to preserve uniformity in the areas of law deemed fundamental 
enough that uniformity is required for a functioning economy, such as the 
rule that consideration is required for a contract to be valid.71 This fear is 
also based in part on a utilitarian desire to minimize the cost of doing 
business in the state: states do not want to impose the extra costs associated 
with requiring businesses to research and comply with a number of 
different regulatory regimes out of fear that doing so will drive businesses 
away.72 
The second justification for the private law exception is that it avoids 
the unfairness that would result from imposing large penalties for violating 
hard-to-find local rules. As Professor Gary Schwartz explains, “because of 
the poor accessibility of city legal documents, the chances of inadvertent 
and excusable error in the ascertainment of city law are quite high.”73 
While this is obviously true of local public laws as well as local private 
laws, the consequences of violating private laws can be extreme.74 For 
example, one could imagine a whole system of contracts upholding an 
important business relationship collapsing because they were discovered to 
be in violation of an unusual and obscure local ordinance governing 
contract validity. 
Finally, the private law exception addresses the structural incoherence 
caused by the lack of municipal courts with jurisdiction over violations of 
municipal ordinances. Because states do not give municipal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over violations of local ordinances,75 disputes 
concerning local ordinances are often litigated in state courts.76 Professor 
Diller refers to this as the “reverse-commandeering argument” against the 
 
 69 See New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149, 1163 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2005) (“Commentators and courts have expressed concern about home rule municipalities creating a 
patchwork quilt of law that would hamper business transactions and unfairly upset parties’ expectations, 
and we have concluded that this is the primary evil at which the private law exception is aimed.”). 
 70 See Diller, supra note 13, at 1126; Sandalow, supra note 10, at 678–79. 
 71 Sandalow, supra note 10, at 678–79. 
 72 Diller, supra note 13, at 1126. 
 73 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 753. 
 74 Id. at 754. 
 75 See infra Section II.A. 
 76 Diller, supra note 13, at 1155. 
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private law exception.77 The thrust of this argument is that, by creating 
private causes of action that will be heard in state courts, local governments 
are able to externalize the costs of their individual policy goals onto the 
state court system.78 The reverse-commandeering argument takes issue with 
the fact that it is the state, not the local government, that has to pay the 
costs associated with providing a court to hear suits brought under those 
causes of action.79 Part II provides some context for this argument by 
discussing the roles municipal courts play in different states. 
II. MUNICIPAL COURTS 
Different states have different rules pertaining to their municipal 
courts. State rules regarding municipal courts can be analyzed according to 
the view of municipal courts that they embody. On one hand, some state 
rules seem to embody the state’s view that municipal courts are essentially 
state courts of limited jurisdiction. On the other hand, different rules 
suggest that a state views its municipal courts as the judicial branches of 
their respective municipalities. To understand the reverse-commandeering 
system, which treats municipal courts much more like judicial branches of 
their municipalities than state courts of limited jurisdiction, one must 
understand state rules regarding municipal courts and the view of 
municipal courts that those rules embody. This Part attempts to provide 
such an understanding by discussing state rules concerning municipal court 
jurisdiction in Section II.A, the funding of municipal and state courts in 
Section II.B, the selection of municipal court judges in Section II.C, and 
state court oversight of municipal courts in Section II.D. 
A. The Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts 
Perhaps no state rule provides as clear a window into how a state 
views its municipal courts as a state’s rule concerning a municipal court’s 
jurisdiction. States fall into four groups based on their municipal courts’ 
jurisdiction: (1) states with no municipal courts, (2) states with municipal 
courts that function like state courts of limited jurisdiction, (3) states with 
“hybrid” municipal courts, and (4) states with municipal courts that 
function like the judicial branches of their municipalities. 
 
 77 Id. at 1154. Professor Diller was the first to call this argument the reverse-commandeering 
argument, although others have used the term in other contexts. Id. at 1154 n.231. 
 78 Id. at 1153–54. 
 79 Id. 
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The first group is made up of states that have no municipal courts. 
Roughly half of states have no municipal courts.80 In these states, all 
judicial matters involving municipal ordinances are handled in state 
courts.81 
The second group of states includes the five states that limit their 
municipal courts’ jurisdiction to certain cases brought under state laws and 
prevent municipal courts from hearing cases brought under municipal 
law.82 In these states, municipal courts have jurisdiction over a certain 
subset of issues arising under state law and consequently function very 
much like  state courts of limited jurisdiction. For example, in Ohio, a 
statute gives municipal courts original jurisdiction over thirteen types of 
actions governed by state law, ranging from “any civil action . . . of which 
judges of county courts have jurisdiction” to any “proceeding brought . . . 
by the owner of a dog that has been designated as a nuisance dog, 
dangerous dog, or vicious dog”83 as long as “the amount claimed by any 
party . . . does not exceed fifteen thousand dollars.”84 Other states, like 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, have created municipal courts of this 
nature but only in their biggest cities.85 
Third, in ten hybrid states, municipal courts have jurisdiction over 
certain cases brought under state law as well as violations of all municipal 
ordinances.86 For example, in Arizona, municipal courts have jurisdiction 
over “all cases arising under the ordinances of the city or town” as well as 
“violations of laws of the state committed within the limits of the city or 
town.”87 In these states, municipal courts serve as forums for enforcing 
state laws, as well as the ordinances passed by individual municipalities; 
they function both as state courts of limited jurisdiction and as the judicial 
branches of their municipalities. 
 
 80 See Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Limited Jurisdiction Courts, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES, 
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/limited_jurisdiction_courts.cfm?state= 
[https://perma.cc/5R53-HKUA]. 
 81 See id. 
 82 These five states are: Massachusetts, Montana, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. See id. 
 83 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.18(A) (West 2017). 
 84 Id. § 1901.17. 
 85 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 218, § 54 (West 2017) (giving the Boston municipal court jurisdiction 
over certain civil actions); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1123 (West 2016) (establishing the 
Philadelphia Municipal Court’s jurisdiction); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1143 (West 2016) 
(setting forth the jurisdiction of the Pittsburgh Magistrates Court). 
 86 These ten states are Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
Oregon, South Carolina, and Texas. See Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, supra note 80. 
 87 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-402(B) (West 2016). 
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Finally, about eleven states limit the jurisdiction of their municipal 
courts to violations of municipal ordinances.88 In these states, municipal 
courts do not have jurisdiction over cases brought under statutes passed by 
the state legislature. In North Dakota, for example, a municipal court only 
has jurisdiction “to hear, try, and determine offenses against the ordinances 
of the city.”89 These eleven states treat their municipal court more like the 
judicial branches of their municipalities than state courts of limited 
jurisdiction. 
Oftentimes, these states limit municipal courts' jurisdiction over 
certain cases brought under municipal ordinances. For instance, in 
Oklahoma, municipal courts “are limited in jurisdiction to criminal and 
traffic proceedings arising out of infractions of the provisions of ordinances 
of cities and towns”90—they do not have jurisdiction over any civil cases 
brought under municipal ordinances.91 Where this is the case, it is more 
difficult to say that the state conceives of the municipal court as the judicial 
branch of the municipality because its judicial powers are not coextensive 
with its municipalities’ legislative authority. 
Moreover, some states give their municipal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction over certain violations of municipal ordinances. In states that 
do so, municipal courts are the only courts that have jurisdiction over 
certain violations of municipal ordinances—state courts cannot hear these 
cases. Wisconsin, for example, gives its municipal courts “exclusive 
jurisdiction over an action in which a municipality seeks to impose 
forfeitures for violations of municipal ordinances of the municipality that 
operates the court,” with certain exceptions.92 Recall that when states do 
not give municipal courts exclusive jurisdiction over alleged violations of 
municipal ordinances, cases alleging violations of those municipal 
ordinances can be tried in state courts. This is relevant because state courts 
 
 88 These eleven states are: Alabama, Colorado, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, 
supra note 80. 
 89 N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-18-01(1) (2017). 
 90 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-18-01(3) (2017) (stating that North 
Dakota municipal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear violations of certain ordinances pertaining to 
driving under the influence). 
 91 It is currently unclear whether Oklahoma local governments have the authority to pass 
ordinances creating civil causes of action. See Diller, supra note 13, at 1169. What is clear from the 
plain language of the Oklahoma Constitution is that if Oklahoma local governments do have the 
authority to create civil causes of action, Oklahoma municipal courts do not have the authority to 
preside over cases brought under such ordinances. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (limiting the 
jurisdiction of Oklahoma’s municipal courts to criminal and traffic proceedings). 
 92 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 755.045(1) (West  2017). 
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are almost exclusively financed using state, not municipal, funds.93 Thus, 
when states do not give municipal courts exclusive jurisdiction over alleged 
violations of municipal ordinances, the costs of judicially enforcing those 
ordinances is paid by the state. 
Colorado has a unique system for determining the jurisdiction of 
municipal courts. The Colorado Constitution gives home rule 
municipalities the authority to determine the jurisdiction of their municipal 
courts.94 Colorado laws then require each local government to “create a 
municipal court to hear and try all alleged violations of ordinance 
provisions of such city or town.”95 The Colorado Supreme Court has held 
that home rule cities’ authority to determine the jurisdiction of their 
municipal courts includes the authority to grant their municipal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over ordinance violations.96 Thus, in Colorado, home 
rule municipalities must establish municipal courts with jurisdiction over 
violations of municipal ordinances, and can choose whether or not to make 
the municipal court’s jurisdiction over those cases exclusive. 
B. Funding Municipal and State Courts 
State rules on the funding of municipal and state courts also can be 
analyzed in terms of the underlying view of municipal courts that they 
seem to embody. However, there is little variation among these state rules 
(unlike with state rules on municipal court jurisdiction); states generally 
require municipalities to fund their own municipal courts. In fact, the 
National Center for State Courts limits its definition of municipal courts to 
those “funded largely by a local unit of government.”97 In New Jersey, for 
example, “municipal courts are established and funded by their respective 
municipalities.”98 New Jersey has specific statutes requiring municipalities 
to provide municipal court facilities,99 pay municipal judges’ salaries,100 and 
 
 93 See infra notes 105–08 and accompanying text. 
 94 Town of Frisco v. Baum, 90 P.3d 845, 847 (Colo. 2004) (basing this conclusion largely on 
Article XX, Section 6 of the Colorado Constitution, which grants home rule cities the power to control 
“[t]he creation of municipal courts [and] the definition and regulation of the[ir] jurisdiction”). 
 95 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-10-104 (2016). 
 96 Frisco, 90 P.3d at 849–50 (stating that “[w]hen a municipality exercises jurisdiction to address 
local and municipal matters in its municipal court, the [state] court will consequently be denied original 
jurisdiction over those matters,” and holding that Frisco’s creation of a municipal court with exclusive 
jurisdiction over claims arising from municipal ordinances was constitutional). 
 97 Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Municipal Courts Resource Guide, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE 
STATES, http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Special-Jurisdiction/Municipal-Courts/Resource-Guide.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/UV5Z-PY73]. 
 98 In re Raphael, 230 B.R. 657, 667 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 238 B.R. 69 
(D.N.J. 1999). 
 99 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:12-15 (West 2017). 
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pay municipal court personnel.101 New Jersey is not unusual in this 
regard;102 state funding of municipal courts is very rare and has actually 
been described as an “anachronism.”103 Washington, however, does have a 
program under which state funds pay a portion of municipal court 
salaries.104 
When they require municipalities to fund their own municipal courts, 
states treat municipal courts like judicial branches of their municipalities 
(and therefore the municipality’s financial burden), not state courts of 
limited jurisdiction (which one would expect to be funded by the state). A 
cynical explanation for the relative uniformity in this area of law as 
compared to state laws concerning municipal court jurisdiction might 
suggest that the uniformity stems from a state’s financial incentives: as far 
as funding is concerned, states save money by treating municipal courts 
like judicial branches of their municipality, but as far as jurisdiction is 
concerned, states can save money by treating municipal courts like limited 
jurisdiction state courts and requiring that they expend their (municipally 
supplied) resources on enforcing state laws. 
State courts, on the other hand, are generally funded by states, not 
local governments. According to a National Center for State Courts survey, 
almost all state courts expenses are divided among states and counties, 
which are sometimes required to fund various aspects of trial-level courts 
located within their county borders.105 Municipal governments are almost 
never required to contribute to state court funding.106 Florida, for example, 
 
 100 Id. § 2B:12-7. 
 101 Id. § 2B:12-10. 
 102 See, e.g., John M. Greacen & Robert J. Klein, Statewide Planning for Court Security, 
576 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 109, 110 n.2 (2001) (stating that New Mexico’s municipal 
courts are funded by municipalities); Comm’n on Justice, Efficiency, & Accountability, Funding Our 
Courts: Finding a Balance, WASH. CTS., https://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/?fa=committee. 
display&item_id=253&committee_id=99 [https://perma.cc/2SBJ-MD5M] (“[Washington’s m]unicipal 
courts are funded exclusively by cities.”); How Courts Work, CIV. L. SELF-HELP CTR, 
http://www.civillawselfhelpcenter.org/self-help/getting-started/court-basics/55-how-courts-work 
[https://perma.cc/ZTB6-LZ3U] (“Each of [Nevada’s] municipal courts is funded by the city in which it 
is located . . . .”). 
 103 Anthony v. Michigan, 35 F. Supp. 2d 989, 993 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (stating that Michigan’s 
Recorder’s Court was an anomaly because it “was the only municipal court that was funded by the 
state”). 
 104 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.56.030(22) (West 2016). 
 105 See Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Budgets and Funding, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES, 
http://www.ncsc.org/Information-and-Resources/Budget-Resource-Center/Budget_Funding.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/56CJ-ZVP2]. 
 106 See id. (failing to mention local governments as a source of state court funding). However, at 
least one state does require a city to contribute to the funding of at least one state district court. See 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-108 (2016) (requiring the City of Lewisville to contribute a portion of the 
salary of the Lafayette County District Court Judge). 
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provides in its Constitution that “[a]ll justices and judges shall be 
compensated only by state salaries” and no municipality is required to 
contribute any funding to the state court system.107 
C. Selection of Municipal Judges and State Court Judges 
States are free to determine the means through which municipal 
judges are selected.108 However, almost all states allow municipalities to 
select the judges for their municipal courts.109 In this way, states seem to 
treat municipal courts more like the judicial branches of their 
municipalities (which one would expect to be staffed by the municipality) 
than like state courts of limited jurisdiction (which one would expect to be 
staffed by state-appointed judges). Massachusetts is the only state that 
retains the power to appoint municipal judges.110 There, municipal judges 
are appointed by the governor with the consent of the Governor’s 
Council.111 
States also have the power to appoint state court judges and choose to 
do so through a number of different means, including elections and 
appointments.112 Notably, no state delegates the authority to appoint any 
state judges to a municipality; state judges are either appointed by state 
officials, or elected by electorates that are not correlated with any specific 
city (i.e., by district, county, or circuit).113 The result is that states currently 
retain the power to select state judges but not the power to select municipal 
judges, with the exception of Massachusetts. 
 
 107 FLA. CONST. art. V, § 14(a). 
 108 See Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, supra note 80 (describing methods of judicial selection state by 
state). 
 109 Id. In some states, municipalities elect their judges; in other states municipal judges are 
appointed by the municipality; and still in others, they are selected through a municipal appointment 
and confirmation process. Id. Examples of states in which municipal judges are appointed by the 
municipal legislature include Alabama, Arizona, and Colorado. Id. Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, and North Dakota are states in which municipal judges are elected. Id. In Wyoming, mayors 
appoint municipal judges with the consent of municipal legislatures. Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 See Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Selection of Judges, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES, 
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state= 
[https://perma.cc/9E46-ZECK]. 
 113 See id. 
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D. State Court Appellate Review 
States have the authority to determine which municipal court 
decisions, if any, may be appealed and to which court.114 Such rules can 
again be analyzed in terms of the view of municipal courts that they seem 
to represent. Almost all states that allow for municipal courts have enacted 
legislation that provides some form of state court appellate review of 
certain municipal court decisions.115 For example, a Kansas statute gives 
defendants “the right to appeal to the district court of the county from any 
judgment of a municipal court which adjudges the defendant guilty of a 
violation of the ordinances of any municipality of Kansas or any findings 
of contempt.”116 
States differ on exactly which municipal court decisions can be 
appealed. Some states, like Kansas, only allow defendants to appeal 
adverse decisions.117 Others, like Montana, allow any party to appeal.118 
States also differ on the scope of appellate review of municipal court 
decisions. In Montana, for example, “[t]he appeal is confined to review of 
the record and questions of law.”119 In North Dakota, on the other hand, 
appeal results in a whole new trial.120 
By providing for state court appellate review of municipal decisions 
concerning municipal law, states seem to be treating municipal courts more 
like state courts of limited jurisdiction (from which appeal to a higher state 
court is to be expected) than the judicial branches of their municipalities 
(which could be entrusted with the interpretation and enforcement of their 
own municipal laws). In this way, state laws concerning the appellate 
review of municipal court decisions are theoretically similar to current state 
laws giving municipal courts jurisdiction over cases brought under state 
law but are markedly different from state laws requiring municipalities to 
staff and fund their own municipal courts, which treat municipal courts 
more like judicial branches of their municipalities. It is important to keep in 
mind the current state of the law in these areas, as well as the view of 
 
 114 See 9A MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 27:84, Westlaw (database 
updated Mar. 2017) (noting that there is no common law right to appeal municipal court decisions and 
that such a right only exists when authorized by law). 
 115 Id. § 27:84 n.3 (citing cases from thirty-five states acknowledging some form of appellate 
review of decisions by municipal courts). 
 116 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3609(a) (West 2017). 
 117 Id. 
 118 MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-6-110(1) (West 2017) (“A party may appeal to district court from a 
municipal court judgment or order.”). 
 119 Id. 
 120 City of Grand Forks v. Lamb, 697 N.W.2d 362, 364 (N.D. 2005) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-
18-19 (2016); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 37(j)). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
102 
municipal courts which they seem to represent, when considering the 
reverse-commandeering system proposed by this Note. 
III. THE REVERSE-COMMANDEERING SYSTEM 
This Note suggests an alternative to the current state systems for 
delegating political and judicial authority to local governments: the reverse-
commandeering system. This system is designed to address the two 
primary problems with current systems for distributing state and local 
authority. The first problem is that the private law exception to home rule 
authority prevents local governments from passing private laws, thereby 
depriving local governments of a powerful means of accomplishing their 
policy objectives and differentiating themselves from one another. The 
second problem is that, in many states, municipal ordinances are enforced 
in state-funded courts with the result that the entire state pays the costs 
associated with a municipality’s policy preferences. 
There are four aspects of the reverse-commandeering system: (1) local 
governments with home rule authority; (2) municipal courts staffed and 
funded by local governments with exclusive jurisdiction over the violation 
of local ordinances; (3) state courts with the ability to hear allegations that 
local ordinances or judicial processes violate state law; and (4) the reverse-
commandeering exception, a state law preventing a local government from 
passing ordinances that it cannot enforce in its municipal court. 
Under this reverse-commandeering system, local governments have 
the authority to pass all types of local legislation as long as they can 
enforce that legislation in their municipal courts. States can craft specific 
limits on local legislation by passing state legislation that preempts local 
ordinances or explicitly forbids local governments from legislating on 
certain topics. Additionally, state courts retain the ability to declare local 
ordinances or court proceedings invalid under state law. 
This Part begins with four short sections that briefly set forth each 
core aspect of the reverse-commandeering system and discuss how that 
aspect could be implemented. It concludes with a discussion of the reverse-
commandeering system as a whole that is meant to give readers a better 
sense of how the parts of the system come together into a cohesive system 
of state and local political and judicial authority. 
A. Home Rule Authority 
In the reverse-commandeering system, local governments have home 
rule authority—the authority to pass local laws. The reverse-
commandeering system is based on a belief that local governments can 
112:83 (2017) The Reverse-Commandeering System 
103 
effectively address local problems121 and recognizes that local governments 
must have the power to initiate local legislation to do so. Local 
governments are not, however, given immunity from state interference: 
local ordinances passed under a local government’s home rule authority 
can be proscribed or preempted by state legislation. Furthermore, home 
rule only gives local governments the ability to pass “local” laws—they 
cannot pass laws that address a purely statewide concern.122 In this way, the 
reverse-commandeering system preserves states’ ability to supervise their 
local governments, and acknowledges that local governments are creatures 
of the state with geographically confined authority. 
Forty-one states currently give at least some of their local 
governments home rule authority.123 In these states, the first aspect of the 
reverse-commandeering system, home rule, is already in place. In the nine 
states that currently do not give their local governments home rule 
authority, implementing the reverse-commandeering system would require 
enacting a positive law giving local governments home rule authority. This 
law could take the form of a piece of state legislation or an amendment to 
the state constitution. Passing an amendment to a state constitution is the 
preferable approach, as such amendments are typically more difficult to 
overturn and, consequently, less subject to revision than state legislation.124 
Furthermore, placing provisions in state constitutions establishing local 
government authority and the relationship between state governments and 
their subunits accords with one of the primary historical roles of 
constitutions: defining the structural relationship between branches and 
levels of government.125 
 
 121 See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 122 See Webb v. City of Black Hawk, 295 P.3d 480, 486 (Colo. 2013) (stating that home rule does 
not give a local government the ability to regulate “in matters of statewide concern”). It should be noted 
that defining what qualifies as “local” has proven challenging, and different states have developed 
different tests. See, e.g., New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 So. 2d 
1098, 1103 (La. 2002); Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Review & Grievance Bd. of Brookline, 260 N.E.2d 
200, 205 (Mass. 1970); New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149, 1158 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 2005) (all providing different standards for determining when a home rule city can enact an 
ordinance under its power to regulate “local” affairs). 
 123 See Briffault, supra note 19, at 10–11. 
 124 John Dinan, Policy Provisions in State Constitutions: The Standards and Practice of State 
Constitution-Making in the Post-Baker v. Carr Era, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 155, 197 (2014) (“At the least, 
state constitution-makers have concluded, entrenching policy commitments in state constitutions and 
thereby erecting a higher barrier to reversing them can make it more difficult for popular majorities to 
engage in backsliding, even if it cannot ultimately prevent them from doing so through a subsequent 
amendment.”). 
 125 PAUL G. KAUPER, CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2, THE 
STATE CONSTITUTION: ITS NATURE AND PURPOSE 2 (1961) (tracing the principle that “the fundamental 
structure and organization of government . . . should be incorporated in a written document recognized 
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B. Municipal Courts 
The reverse-commandeering system also requires states to allow 
municipalities to create, staff, and fund their own municipal courts. Note 
that municipalities would not be required to create municipal courts; they 
would merely have the option to do so. As discussed above, municipal 
courts are usually paid for by municipalities, and states usually pay the 
costs of state courts.126 Thus, requiring municipalities to fund municipal 
courts will generally not involve any changes to state laws, although in rare 
instances, state laws allowing for state funding of municipal courts might 
have to be repealed and replaced. Municipalities also have the power to 
select municipal judges in every state except Massachusetts,127 so only 
Massachusetts would have to take any action to implement that aspect of 
the reverse-commandeering system. 
In the reverse-commandeering system, municipal courts have 
exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases alleging only violations of 
municipal ordinances. Thus, every case involving only alleged violations of 
municipal ordinances would be brought before the court of the municipality 
that issued the ordinances.128 Municipal courts do not, however, have 
jurisdiction over alleged violations of state laws. Those cases are sent to 
state courts. 
Currently about half the states have no municipal courts.129 For these 
states to implement this aspect of the reverse-commandeering system, they 
would have to pass a law or an amendment that (1) gives municipalities the 
ability to create and fund their own municipal courts and (2) gives those 
municipal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases only alleging violations 
of municipal ordinances. Of the states that do have municipal courts, none 
currently give their municipal courts exclusive jurisdiction over all 
violations of municipal ordinances.130 Thus, implementing the reverse-
 
to have . . . the quality of a fundamental law superior to ordinary laws and enactments” to England and 
colonial America). 
 126 See supra Section II.C. 
 127 See supra Section II.D. 
 128 This Note does not take a definitive position on the allocation of jurisdiction over cases alleging 
violations of both municipal ordinances and violations of other (state or federal) laws. In the reverse-
commandeering system, states would be able to make this decision based on their individual 
preferences. 
 129 Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, supra note 80. 
 130 See supra Section II.A. Colorado comes closest by requiring cities to establish municipal courts 
with jurisdiction over cases alleging violations of municipal ordinances and giving cities the option to 
make the municipal courts' jurisdiction over those cases exclusive. Thus, Colorado would have a 
relatively easy time implementing this aspect of the reverse-commandeering system: it would merely 
have to (1) make it optional (rather than mandatory) for cities to create municipal courts and (2) insist 
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commandeering system would require states that currently have municipal 
courts to amend their provisions governing municipal court jurisdiction. 
C. State Court Supervision of Local Governments and Their Courts 
In the reverse-commandeering system, state court supervision of 
municipalities and their courts is restricted to ensuring municipal actions 
comply with state laws. Currently, state courts review municipal court 
interpretations of municipal laws in the same manner a government’s 
appellate courts review the decisions of the government’s trial courts. In 
some states, appellate courts review municipal court decisions de novo;131 
in other states, appellate courts give some deference to municipal court 
decisions.132 Under the reverse-commandeering system, the role of a state 
court reviewing a municipal court decision is more akin to the role of a 
federal court reviewing a state court judgment.133 The state appellate court 
is not responsible for correcting or revising the municipal court’s 
interpretation of a municipal ordinance; its role is simply to determine (1) 
whether the local ordinance, as interpreted by the state, violates any state 
laws and (2) whether the municipal court proceeding conformed with all 
state procedural requirements.134 
States currently have the authority to determine which municipal court 
decisions may be appealed and to which court, and they codify their 
decisions on these matters in state statutes.135 In states that already have 
municipal courts, implementing the form of state judicial review prescribed 
by the reverse-commandeering would merely require revising the state 
 
that municipal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases alleging violations of municipal ordinances 
(rather than giving cities the option to make that jurisdiction exclusive). 
 131 E.g., State v. Allen, 563 A.2d 1169, 1170 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1989) (“[T]he trial of the 
appeal [from a municipal court] shall be heard de novo on the record [except in certain circumstances 
where the appellate court] may either reverse and remand for a new trial or conduct a plenary trial de 
novo without a jury.”). 
 132 E.g., Roberts-Manchester Pub. Co. v. Wise, 140 Ill. App. 443, 444 (1908) (announcing that state 
appellate courts reviewing the judgments of municipal courts ask whether “the judgment is contrary to 
the law and the evidence, or . . . resulted from substantial errors”). 
 133 Federal judicial review of state court decisions is limited to questions of federal law (i.e., federal 
courts do not review state decisions on matters of state law) and only occurs via review of habeas 
corpus petitions and the United States Supreme Court’s power of direct review. Margery I. Miller, A 
Different View of Habeas: Interpreting AEDPA’s “Adjudicated on the Merits” Clause When Habeas 
Corpus Is Understood as an Appellate Function of the Federal Courts, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2593, 
2598 (2004). 
 134 See Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 159 (1825) (confirming that federal courts 
defer to state court interpretation of state laws); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 380 
(1816) (announcing that the United States Supreme Court can review the decisions of state courts to 
ensure that they comply with federal law). 
 135 See supra Section II.A. 
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statutes determining the scope of judicial review of municipal decisions. 
States without municipal courts would have to pass laws implementing 
judicial review of their newly created municipal courts with this scope. 
In the reverse-commandeering system, state courts with appellate 
jurisdiction over municipal court decisions, as well as all other state courts, 
are funded by the state and not by local governments. Currently, most 
states do not require local governments to contribute to funding state 
courts, even those located within their borders, 136 so in most states, 
implementing the reverse-commandeering system would not require any 
change in state court funding. In the few states that do require local 
governments to contribute money to state courts, the laws imposing that 
requirement would have to be changed to avoid duplicative or unreasonable 
cost impositions on local governments. 
D. The Reverse-Commandeering Exception 
The most innovative aspect of the reverse-commandeering system is 
the reverse-commandeering exception. Like the private law exception,137 
the reverse-commandeering exception is a legal rule that prevents local 
governments from using their home rule authority to pass certain 
ordinances—it creates an exception to local governments’ home rule 
powers. Under the reverse-commandeering exception, local governments 
may not pass ordinances that cannot be enforced in their municipal courts. 
Put more formally, a local government may only pass an ordinance if a 
case alleging only a violation of that ordinance would be within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of that local government’s municipal court. 
In states with the private law exception, implementing the reverse-
commandeering system requires replacing the private law exception with 
the reverse-commandeering exception. In states where the private law 
exception is written into the state constitution, implementing the reverse-
commandeering system would require an amendment rewriting the relevant 
provision of the state constitution. In states where the private law exception 
comes from a state statute, the reverse-commandeering exception could 
also be implemented by a legislative decision to revise the state statute, but 
an amendment would be ideal. 
An amendment is also the ideal means of implementing the reverse-
commandeering system in states where the private law exception is the 
product of a judicial decision. Perhaps more easily, in such states, the state 
judiciary could implement this aspect of the reverse-commandeering 
 
 136 See supra Section II.C. 
 137 See supra Section I.C. 
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system by overturning the opinion that implemented the private-law 
exception and replacing it with the reverse-commandeering exception. 
While the specific content of the overruling opinion will necessarily be 
tailored to the content of the original opinion, judges should be able to 
justify their reversal by focusing on developments in the last century that 
solidified the status of local home rule authority and popular criticisms of 
the private law exception. 
E. The Reverse-Commandeering System: How Its Elements Work Together 
The previous four subsections discussed the four core elements of the 
reverse-commandeering system: (1) local governments with home rule 
authority, (2) municipal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over violations 
of local ordinances, (3) state courts with jurisdiction over cases alleging 
that municipal ordinances or judicial processes violate state laws, and (4) 
the reverse-commandeering exception. Combined, these elements create a 
system in which a local government can pass local laws, cases involving 
violations of those laws go before the local government’s municipal court, 
and state courts retain the ability to declare municipal laws and proceedings 
invalid because they violate state law. States are also able to limit the kinds 
of ordinances that local governments could pass by enacting state 
legislation that preempts local ordinances or explicitly forbids local 
governments from legislating on certain topics. Local governments are 
required to fund the municipal courts, and states are required to fund the 
state courts that review local ordinances for compliance with state law. 
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE REVERSE-COMMANDEERING SYSTEM 
This Part discusses the advantages of the reverse-commandeering 
system over the current systems of allocating state and local political and 
judicial authority. Each section is dedicated to a particular advantage of the 
system. Section IV.A first recaps the benefits of home rule. Then, Section 
IV.B discusses the advantages the reverse-commandeering system has over 
the private law exception, including the ways the reverse-commandeering 
system better serves the purposes ascribed to the private law exception. 
Section IV.C explains the advantages of municipal courts with exclusive 
jurisdiction over municipal ordinances, and Section IV.D discusses the 
benefits of restricting state court supervision of municipalities to 
determining whether municipal actions violate state law. Lastly, Section 
IV.E concludes by arguing that the reverse-commandeering system 
minimizes confusion over whether a law was passed by a state legislature 
or a municipality. 
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A. The Benefits of Home Rule 
Because the reverse-commandeering system gives local governments 
home rule authority, states that employ the reverse-commandeering system 
will be able to realize all the benefits of home rule. First, home rule is good 
for cities. Each city is different, with its own peculiar characteristics, 
strengths, and challenges. Home rule gives cities the ability to fashion a set 
of local rules that capitalize on their particular advantages and address their 
particular problems.138 Whereas state legislatures pass laws that apply 
throughout the whole state,139 home rule allows cities to impose city-
specific policies that might not work well across a whole state. 
Home rule also offers other benefits. It allows different cities to 
develop different sets of laws and city programs, which benefits everyone 
who can move to a new city by providing them with a wider variety of 
choices of local legal and political systems.140 Home rule, and the 
differentiation in local laws that comes with it, also benefits the larger 
political community because the innovative laws and programs developed 
by cities can be used as models for state, and even federal, programs.141 
B. Advantages over the Private Law Exception 
This Section presents the advantages the reverse-commandeering 
system has over systems that employ the private law exception. Section 
IV.B.1 lays out the advantages that directly result from allowing cities to 
pass private laws, specifically that doing so provides cities with a powerful 
means of addressing city-specific problems and differentiating themselves 
from other cities, thereby opening up a potentially vibrant arena of local 
policy experimentation. Section IV.B.2 then argues that the reverse-
commandeering system is also a more logical means of furthering the 
supposed goals of the private law exception, including ensuring uniformity 
in local laws on topics where uniformity is required, addressing the 
unfairness of heavy punishments for hard-to-find local rules, and 
preventing cities from burdening states with the judicial costs of their 
policy preferences. 
 
 138 See Darwin Farrar, In Defense of Home Rule: California’s Preemption of Local Firearms 
Regulation, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 51, 55 (1996) (specifically arguing that different cities have 
different issues with gun violence that require different local solutions). 
 139 See Harry Hubbard, Special Legislation for Municipalities, 18 HARV. L. REV. 588, 588 (1905) 
(noting that as early as 1905 most states prohibited state legislatures from passing laws that specifically 
stated that they only apply in or to one city). 
 140 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. This statement simplifies and combines points 
made by Charles Tiebout and Robert Nozick discussed in Section II.B. 
 141 Joshua A. Douglas, Local Democracy on the Ballot, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 174 (2017) 
(discussing how local election law reforms may eventually be adopted by states). 
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1. The Benefits of Private Local Laws 
The primary advantage the reverse-commandeering system has over 
systems that utilize a private law exception is simply that the reverse-
commandeering system allows local governments to enact private laws. All 
the justifications for local home rule apply just as strongly to a local 
government’s ability to pass private laws as they do to a local 
government’s ability to pass public laws. 
If home rule is a positive because it enhances citizen choice by 
allowing cities to pass laws that shape their communities and differentiate 
themselves from other cities, then private city laws are a positive because 
they increase cities’ ability to shape their communities and differentiate 
themselves from other cities. For example, people and businesses may or 
may not want to live in a city that requires private employers to pay a 
higher-than-average minimum wage or a city that requires private 
employers to provide health insurance to their employees. Giving cities the 
ability to pass these sorts of private laws creates a situation where people 
and businesses can make that choice. A few examples of the areas where 
cities could shape their communities and differentiate themselves from 
other cities by passing a private law include discrimination (in different 
areas, like employment and housing, as well as against different groups, 
like LGBT individuals), affordable housing, minimum wage, and the 
environment. The breadth of these areas makes it clear exactly how much 
differentiation could result from providing cities with the ability to pass 
private laws. 
Additionally, cities can use private laws, as well as public laws, to 
craft local solutions to local problems. If, for example, racial bias in 
employment is a problem in a city, allowing the city to pass a public law 
criminalizing racially biased hiring may help address the problem. An 
ordinance allowing those injured by racially biased hiring to bring a lawsuit 
against the companies that did not hire them because of their race might 
also have an impact. Giving cities both tools can only increase their ability 
to address the problem. 
Fayetteville’s recent ordinance prohibiting private discrimination 
against LGBT individuals shows the possible benefits of “private” local 
ordinances. Arkansas state law does not include LGBT individuals among 
those protected from discrimination from nonpublic entities.142 In 
September 2015, Fayetteville, Arkansas, passed an ordinance protecting 
 
 142 See Ellen Lampe, AR Supreme Court Abolishes Fayetteville’s LGBT Protections, 
ARKANSASMATTERS.COM (Feb. 23, 2017, 5:26 PM), http://www.arkansasmatters.com/news/local-
news/ar-supreme-court-abolishes-fayettevilles-lgbt-protections/661781919 [https://perma.cc/6TRS-
J3UB]. 
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LGBT individuals from private discrimination.143 Allowing Fayetteville to 
prohibit private discrimination against LGBT individuals would increase 
Fayetteville’s practical ability to combat private discrimination against 
LGBT individuals. Further, allowing Fayetteville to prohibit private anti-
LGBT discrimination would give Fayetteville the ability to differentiate 
itself from the other cities in Arkansas that do not have similar 
ordinances.144 This would result in increased choice for the people of 
Arkansas145: they would be able to choose to live in a city that prohibits 
discrimination against LGBT individuals or one that does not.146 
Allowing cities to pass private laws would also open up a whole new 
forum for local experimentation. One of the virtues of the United States 
federal system is that it allows states to experiment with policies before 
they are accepted at the national level.147 As Justice Louis Brandeis stated, 
states can serve as laboratories of democracy because their size and 
independence allow them to test drive policies without risk to the rest of the 
country.148 Cities can serve the same role within states; if permitted, cities 
can adopt innovative local policies without much risk to the rest of the 
state.149 The private law exception has prevented local governments from 
experimenting with private laws, hindering states’ ability to preview the 
impact of private laws passed at the state level. Removing it will only lead 
to more local experimentation and better informed decisionmaking at the 
state level. 
 
 143 Fayetteville, Ark., Ordinance 5781 (June 16, 2016). The ordinance was entitled, “An Ordinance 
To Ensure Uniform Nondiscrimination Protections Within The City of Fayetteville For Groups Already 
Protected To Varying Degrees Throughout State Law.” Id. 
 144 Only three other cities in Arkansas have ordinances that prohibit discrimination against LGBT 
individuals: Eureka Springs, Hot Springs, and Texarkana. Two Notices Filed to Appeal Judge’s Ruling 
Upholding Fayetteville Anti-Discrimination Ordinance, NWAHOMEPAGE.COM, 
http://www.nwahomepage.com/news/two-notices-filed-to-appeal-judges-ruling-upholding-fayetteville-
anti-discrimination-ordinance/414717537 [https://perma.cc/ZP2C-NGAD]. 
 145 Fayetteville’s antidiscrimination ordinance was struck down by the Arkansas Supreme Court on 
the grounds that it violated an Arkansas state statute prohibiting local governments from outlawing 
discrimination that is not prohibited by state law. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 146 While most people do not cite the laws of a city as the primary reason they moved there, 
D’VERA COHN & RICH MORIN, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, AMERICAN MOBILITY : WHO MOVES? WHO 
STAYS PUT? WHERE’S HOME? 13, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2011/04/ 
American-Mobility-Report-updated-12-29-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRZ4-UZKF], evidence suggests 
that the protections a city provides to LGBT individuals factors into LGBT individuals’ decisions on 
whether to move to that city, see Samantha Allen, Why LGBT Individuals Are Moving to Red States, 
DAILY BEAST (Mar. 9, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/why-lgbt-people-are-moving-
to-red-states [https://perma.cc/5BNQ-HEES]. 
 147 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Legislative Notes: Introduction, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 359, 359 (2008). 
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2. The Ways in Which the Reverse-Commandeering System More 
Logically Addresses the Goals of the Private Law Exception 
This subpart argues that the reverse-commandeering system more 
logically addresses the three major goals of the private law exception. 
Section IV.B.2.a argues that the need for uniformity in local law can be 
adequately addressed through state legislatures' ability to preempt local 
laws and prevent local governments from legislating on certain topics. 
Next, Section IV.B.2.b argues that any concerns about the accessibility of 
local laws are more logically addressed by state laws designed to ensure a 
certain level of accessibility, not the private law exception. Finally, Section 
IV.B.2.c notes that the private law exception does not completely stop local 
governments from commandeering state judicial resources, as it allows 
local governments to pass public laws that are enforced in state courts, 
whereas the reverse-commandeering system does completely stop reverse 
commandeering by giving municipal courts exclusive jurisdiction over 
cases involving local ordinances. 
a. The Need for Uniformity in Local Law 
A common justification for the private law exception is that it 
prevents the disruption to commerce that would occur if each local 
government had its own unique rules governing private business 
activities.150 The thrust of this argument is that maintaining uniformity in 
certain areas of private law is required for a functioning state economy.151 
This may well be true for certain private laws, like the rule requiring 
consideration for a valid contract. However, it is likely not true for other 
types of private laws, such as local laws requiring private employers to pay 
a minimum wage; studies have shown that state and local economies do not 
come crashing down when local governments can impose their own 
minimum wages.152 
The reverse-commandeering system acknowledges that statewide 
uniformity in all areas of the private law is not necessary for a state 
economy to thrive but that uniformity may be necessary in certain areas. 
Thus, the reverse-commandeering system eliminates the private law 
exception, which prevents local governments from passing laws on private 
law topics for which uniformity is not required. This leaves states free to 
make their own informed judgments on which private law topics require 
 
 150 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 151 Diller, supra note 13, at 1123. 
 152 NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, CITY MINIMUM WAGE LAWS: RECENT TRENDS AND ECONOMIC 
EVIDENCE 6–7 (2016) (summarizing a number of studies that have shown that city minimum wage laws 
“have boosted earnings without slowing job growth or causing business relocations”). 
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statewide uniformity and to address those issues specifically through state 
legislation that would either preempt or explicitly forbid local ordinances 
on those issues. These state statutes would be enforced in state courts. The 
reverse-commandeering system therefore extends local home rule, and its 
accompanying benefits, into the private law sphere without depriving states 
of their ability to address local ordinances that are harmful to statewide 
economies. 
For example, while Fayetteville’s antidiscrimination ordinance was 
being debated, Arkansas passed a statute that prevented local governments 
from “prohibit[ing] discrimination on a basis not contained in state law”153 
in order “to improve intrastate commerce by ensuring that businesses, 
organizations, and employers doing business in the state are subject to 
uniform nondiscrimination laws.”154 In February 2017, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court struck down Fayetteville’s antidiscrimination ordinance 
because it violated this state statute by expanding protection against 
discrimination to LGBT individuals.155 While one may or may not agree 
that the Arkansas statute is wise and just (or that its actual purpose is to 
improve the state economy), it is an excellent example of a state addressing 
concerns about statewide uniformity through specific pieces of legislation 
rather than through a general private law exception. 
b. Concerns About Large Penalties for Hard-to-Find Local 
Rules 
Supporters of the private law exception also argue that it prevents the 
unfairness of imposing large penalties for violating local ordinances that 
can be difficult to locate. However, any concerns that states have about the 
accessibility of local ordinances are more logically addressed by rules 
requiring local governments to make their codes easily accessible. States 
could, for example, require local governments to make their ordinances 
available on their city websites. 
States could also address their concerns about the potential of large 
penalties for violating local ordinances by passing statutes that prevent 
local governments from enacting ordinances that, if violated, could result in 
a company or individual being liable for more than a certain amount of 
money. Such a statute may not be advisable, as it would prevent local 
governments from passing most private laws (as private laws often carry 
the potential of significant damages if violated) and, consequently, 
effectively function like a private law exception. However, the reverse-
 
 153 ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-1-403 (2016). 
 154 Id. § 14-1-402. 
 155 Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville, 510 S.W.3d 258, 263 (Ark. 2017). 
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commandeering system allows state legislatures to weigh the benefits of 
local private law against concerns about excessive damage awards and to 
balance them as they see fit. Perhaps a better solution would be to pass a 
state statute that caps the amount of damages that can be awarded based on 
a violation of a local ordinance at a number acceptable to the state. This 
solution would allow for the realization of some of the benefits of local 
governments with the authority to pass private laws and also address state 
concerns about large penalties. 
c. Preventing Reverse Commandeering 
Another argument against giving local governments the ability to 
enact private law is based on the fact that, in most states, cases alleging 
violations of those laws would be heard by state courts that are funded by 
the state, not by the local government that passed the law.156 This allows 
local governments to “reverse commandeer” state judicial resources to 
further their own policy preferences.157 The private law exception, the 
argument goes, prevents such reverse commandeering by preventing local 
governments from passing private laws that would have to be enforced in 
lawsuits brought in state courts.158 
However, the private law exception only partially addresses this 
concern because it only prevents cities from passing private laws—local 
governments remain free to pass public laws that are enforced in state 
courts. The reverse-commandeering system, on the other hand, directly 
addresses local commandeering of state judicial resources by requiring 
local governments that wish to exercise their (public or private) lawmaking 
authority to establish and fund municipal courts with jurisdiction over 
alleged violations of their local ordinances. Under this system, local 
governments would be shouldering the costs of the judicial enforcement of 
their ordinances, not the states. Thus, the reverse-commandeering system 
simultaneously expands local legislative authority (by allowing local 
governments to pass private laws) and decreases state expenses associated 
with local legislation (by requiring local legislation be enforced in locally 
funded municipal courts). 
This does not mean that cases involving local ordinances would never 
come before state courts; state courts would still have jurisdiction over 
cases alleging that local ordinances and judicial processes violated state 
law.159 However, state courts would not be able to revise local 
 
 156 Diller, supra note 13, at 1154. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 See supra Section III.C. 
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interpretations of local laws. Thus, these state courts would be furthering 
the states’ interests in ensuring the primacy of state law and protecting the 
substantive and procedural rights guaranteed by the state. Consequently, it 
is appropriate for the state to pay the costs associated with this form of state 
appellate oversight. The reverse-commandeering system, therefore, 
eliminates any concerns about the commandeering of state or local judicial 
resources by requiring local governments to bear the costs of the judicial 
enforcement and interpretation of their ordinances and requiring states to 
pay the costs of furthering their interests served by the form of appellate 
oversight available under the system. 
One trade-off involved with adopting the reverse-commandeering 
system is that a local government’s ability to pass legislation is conditioned 
on its willingness and ability to fund municipal courts. Consequently, poor 
local governments will not be able to pass legislation if they cannot afford 
to fund their municipal courts. However, this trade-off is justified by the 
benefits that come with city-funded municipal courts with exclusive 
jurisdiction over cases involving local ordinances, particularly (1) the 
benefits of municipal courts discussed in Section IV.C and (2) the fact that 
enforcing local laws in state-funded courts violates the basic principle 
against taxation without representation by forcing state residents to pay the 
costs associated with laws passed by local legislative bodies in which they 
are not represented. Furthermore, states and cities have means of 
minimizing the reverse-commandeering system’s negative impact on poor 
cities. States could implement programs designed to help poor local 
governments fund their courts, and cities could revise their taxation 
schemes. When doing so, cities should weigh the benefits of municipal 
courts and municipal legislation versus the detriment to their residents that 
would result from the taxes necessary to fund them. This decision provides 
yet another opportunity for differentiation among cities, and, consequently, 
a further expansion of the variety of political communities available to state 
residents. 
C. The Advantage of Municipal Courts 
Municipal courts do more than just contribute to a logical allocation of 
the costs of judicial enforcement of municipal ordinances. Municipal courts 
with exclusive jurisdiction over cases alleging violations of municipal 
ordinances also give the people of a municipality an appropriate amount of 
control over the judicial enforcement of local ordinances. The idea that 
cases involving violations of a law made by a government’s legislature 
should be heard by the courts of that government is hardly revolutionary. 
As Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist No. 80, “[i]f there are such 
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things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a 
government being coextensive with its legislative, may be ranked among 
the number.”160 The creation of municipal courts with exclusive jurisdiction 
over violations of municipal ordinances applies to municipal governments 
the principle that a government’s judicial power should be equal to its 
legislative power.161 Members of a political community that come together 
to determine the laws that will govern them should also be able to 
collectively control the judicial enforcement of those laws—there is no 
good reason that this general principle should not be applied to local 
governments. 
It may be suggested that this jurisdictional principle should not apply 
to local governments because they are not sovereigns but are merely 
political subdivisions of the state.162 This Note does not argue that local 
governments have any legal right to municipal courts. Rather, this Note 
argues that the current momentum towards robust local political authority 
(in the form of home rule) should be accompanied by an equally strong 
movement towards robust local judicial authority (in the form of municipal 
courts with exclusive jurisdiction over violations of municipal ordinances), 
as the practical and theoretical arguments for the former also support the 
latter.163 
Practically, if one accepts the assertion that home rule is a positive 
because it enables local governments to pass local ordinances that 
capitalize on their unique advantages and address their particular problems, 
one should welcome the possibility of city courts enforcing those city-
specific ordinances.164 The basic principle is that, if a local legislature is in 
the best position to create city laws, the local courts are in the best position 
to enforce and interpret them. Just as local legislatures can be expected to 
be more informed about local issues than state legislatures, local judges can 
be expected to be more informed about local issues than state judges.165 
This increased familiarity should better position local judges to enforce and 
 
 160 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 161 See Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 159 (1825) (acknowledging “the principle, 
supposed to be universally recognised, that the judicial department of every government, where such 
department exists, is the appropriate organ for construing the legislative acts of that government”). 
 162 See City of Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539, 548–49 (1905) (laying 
down the rule that cities are merely creatures of the state). 
 163 See Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 917 (2013) 
(“Although most ‘pro-localism’ theorists have focused their attention on ways local legislatures and 
agencies can promote local goods within state and federal structures, local judges may advance this goal 
as well.”). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Everard Digby, Our Australian Letter, 118 LAW TIMES 81, 83 (1904) (“Local conditions, local 
expressions, local life, and the local meanings of words can alone be underst[ood by] local judges.”). 
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interpret local ordinances, as they will do so with a special understanding 
of the interactions between those ordinances and the reality of everyday life 
in the city.166 Thus, just as state courts are thought to be more competent 
than federal courts at interpreting state law,167 local courts can be expected 
to be more competent than state courts at interpreting local law. 
Furthermore, judges on the municipal courts that make up part of the 
reverse-commandeering system can be expected to gain experience with 
cases involving local ordinances as those cases will make up all of their 
dockets. In states where violations of municipal ordinances are adjudicated 
in state courts, on the other hand, state court judges handle cases involving 
ordinances from multiple municipalities as well as cases involving 
violations of state (and some federal168) laws. Thus, the reverse-
commandeering system will enable municipal courts to develop an 
expertise with municipal law that state courts currently do not have, as a 
larger percentage of their cases will involve violations of the laws of their 
municipality. This supports municipal court jurisdiction over municipal 
violations just as the fact that federal issues make up a larger percentage of 
federal than state dockets supports federal court jurisdiction over cases 
involving federal questions.169 
Municipal court jurisdiction over local ordinances also has the 
advantage of giving local residents an appropriate measure of structural and 
practical control over the interpretation of local laws. Imagine a situation 
where a city is unhappy with the way one of its ordinances has been 
interpreted by a state court judge. Because states get to determine who 
becomes a state court judge,170 the state, by putting the judge who made the 
interpretation in power, has effectively caused the local ordinance to come 
to mean something other than what the city intended it to mean.171 
 
 166 Id. 
 167 Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 
17, 55 (2013) (arguing that state courts are the appropriate interpreters of state law because “state courts 
have superior experience and expertise concerning state law”). 
 168 Congress has the power to provide that only federal courts have jurisdictions of cases brought 
under a law or that both state and federal courts have jurisdiction. Often, it elects to give both state and 
federal courts jurisdiction. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURTS & WHAT THEY DO 5–6 (2006), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/FCtsWh06.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR2J-E9MV]. 
 169 See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on 
Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 333 (1988) (arguing for federal 
court jurisdiction over federal question cases because, based on the percentage of their dockets made up 
of federal cases, “federal courts will have a greater expertise in federal substantive law than will state 
courts”). 
 170 See supra Section II.B. 
 171 As discussed in Section II.C, no states elect state judges via citywide elections; state judicial 
elections are always done according to a geographic unit created by the state like a circuit, county, or 
district. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. Practically, concerns about city oversight of local 
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Furthermore, the city may not have the power to react by replacing the state 
judge. In the reverse-commandeering system, on the other hand, cities will 
have the power to determine who their judges will be and to provide a 
means for their replacement. This will give cities more control over the 
interpretation of city laws, and is more in line with the concept that the 
political community that makes the law should be the political community 
that establishes a mechanism for its judicial enforcement.172 
Increased local control over the interpretation of local ordinances is 
also in line with the theoretical justifications for home rule. As scholars 
such as Tiebout and Nozick explain, the existence of a variety of strong, 
distinct local governments enhance society and democratic choice by 
providing people with a wider range of choices of local political 
communities.173 According to these theories, home rule is a positive 
development because it gives cities more power to pass a wider range of 
laws that differentiate themselves from other cities.174 Municipal courts 
with jurisdiction over violations of local ordinances increase local control 
over the interpretation of local laws, which also fosters differentiation 
among cities.175 They also add another dimension to the choice between 
cities: rather than choosing among cities with different ordinances that will 
all be subject to the same judicial system, people are given the opportunity 
to choose among cities with different ordinances as well as different courts 
responsible for enforcing those ordinances in the first instance.176 Thus, 
implementing the reverse-commandeering system and its role for municipal 
courts would be a positive development because it would lead to more 
differentiation among the local political and judicial communities that 
people can choose to join. 
D. The Advantages of Limited State Court Review of Municipal Actions 
By limiting the scope of state appellate jurisdiction over municipal 
court decisions to determining whether the local ordinance (as interpreted 
by the municipal court) violates state law, and whether the municipal court 
proceeding conformed with all state procedural requirements, the reverse-
commandeering system adequately balances the state’s interests in 
 
state judges is lessened in proportion to the overlap between city voters and the electorate responsible 
for electing a judge and the city. Theoretically, however, inconsistencies persist when the state, not the 
city, has ultimate authority to select judges with the power to definitively interpret local ordinances. 
 172 See supra notes 163–66 and accompanying text. 
 173 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Leib, supra note 163, at 927. 
 176 See id. 
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appellate review and local governments’ interests in interpreting their own 
ordinances. 
As discussed, allowing municipal courts to interpret local ordinances 
has significant practical and theoretical benefits. Practically speaking, if 
state courts were given the ability to overrule municipal court 
interpretations of local ordinances, the advantages of municipal courts 
interpreting them in the first instance would be lost because state courts 
could simply substitute their interpretations for that of the municipal court. 
Such a system would certainly not conform to “the principle, supposed to 
be universally recognised, that the judicial department of every 
government, where such department exists, is the appropriate organ for 
construing the legislative acts of that government.”177 
However, state courts need to be able to review municipal ordinances 
and municipal court proceedings to ensure that they do not violate state 
laws. Otherwise, local governments would be able to violate state laws 
without fear of consequence. The state’s interests in this situation are very 
similar to the United States’ interest in ensuring that state laws and judicial 
proceedings conform to the requirements imposed by the United States 
Constitution and other federal laws.178 The scope of state court appellate 
review of municipal court decisions provided by the reverse-
commandeering system allows the state to validate its interest in ensuring 
local governments are not violating state laws and allows local 
governments to validate their interest in having their ordinances interpreted 
by their own municipal courts. 
One advantage of appellate review that could potentially be lost in the 
reverse-commandeering system is a litigant’s ability to have his or her legal 
argument reevaluated upon appeal. Because state courts will not be able to 
overrule municipal courts in matters of municipal laws, litigants will not be 
able to reassert their arguments on municipal law on appeal. However, 
local governments keen on vindicating this interest have the option of 
creating (and staffing and funding) municipal appellate courts that can hear 
appeals of municipal court decisions on local law. In this way, local 
governments can vindicate this interest without sacrificing their ability to 
render authoritative interpretations of municipal law. 
 
 177 Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 159 (1825). 
 178 See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 160 (“The States, by the plan of the convention, are prohibited 
from doing a variety of things . . . . No man of sense will believe, that such prohibitions would be 
scrupulously regarded, without some effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the 
infractions of them. This power must either be a direct negative on the State laws, or an authority in the 
federal courts to overrule such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles of Union. . . . The 
latter appears to have been thought by the convention preferable to the former, and, I presume, will be 
most agreeable to the States.”). 
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E. Minimizing Confusion over the Source of the Law 
One more justification for the reverse-commandeering system is worth 
mentioning, if only because it would be odd to lay out the reverse-
“commandeering” system without mentioning the United States Supreme 
Court’s doctrine on “commandeering.” Put simply, the Court’s 
commandeering cases have established that Congress cannot compel states 
to regulate.179 This is because “where the Federal Government directs the 
States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public 
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program 
may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”180 
A similar accountability concern is present when state courts are given 
original jurisdiction over local laws and vice versa: the people involved in 
the court proceedings may direct any disapproval they harbor about the law 
being enforced against the government associated with the court enforcing 
it, rather than the government that passed the law. In each instance, the 
confusion results in the proper lawmaker not being held accountable. The 
reverse-commandeering system addresses this concern by giving municipal 
courts exclusive jurisdiction over violations of local ordinances and 
preventing municipal courts from hearing violations of state laws. Thus, 
under the reverse-commandeering system, litigants will know that the 
government associated with the court with original jurisdiction over their 
case is also the government that passed the law being enforced.181 
CONCLUSION 
The positive developments of the last century that have empowered 
local governments in their courts have set the stage for further modification 
of the distribution of local and state authority. States should revise their 
current constitutions and statutes to give local governments the ability pass 
public and private law and to ensure that local ordinances are enforced in 
municipal courts staffed and funded by local governments. Giving local 
governments the ability to pass private law will help them fashion more 
effective local solutions for local problems. It will also contribute to robust, 
differentiated cities, thereby expanding the variety of communities in 
which people can choose to live. Giving municipal courts jurisdiction over 
 
 179 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (“[E]ven where Congress has the 
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power 
directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”) (citations omitted). 
 180 Id. at 169. 
 181 This may not be true in all cases depending on how states decide to handle cases involving 
parties from different cities, and cases involving both state and local claims. However, confusion will 
still be minimized in most instances. 
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violations of local ordinances is another positive step towards local self-
determination because it gives local courts the opportunity to interpret local 
law. Requiring municipal courts be city funded and city staffed and giving 
state courts the ability to ensure municipal actions comply with state law 
appropriately distributes the costs of the judicial system by requiring local 
governments to fund the courts that advance their interests and states to 
fund the courts that advance states’ interest. Any concerns about statewide 
uniformity in certain areas of the law or the excessively high penalties in 
municipal courts can be addressed by state legislation. The result will be a 
system in which local governments are better able to meet the needs of 
their constituents as well as the people of the state in which they are 
located. 
